Over the past week or two the subject has again found its way into the news, and the disagreement over what it refers to has never been more vivid. Is it about ““preferential” treatment of those who benefit directly from affirmative action or is it not? Is it about ““quotas” or about ““goals” and ““timetables”? The problem is that it has over the years, in different episodes, been about all of these things, but few players on either side of the argument feel free to concede as much. Many opponents insist that the term is only a cover for a consistent policy of preferential treatment of its favored beneficiaries–they are generally referring to blacks and women–solely on the basis of their race or gender and in disregard of what may be their rela tive lack of qualification. Many defenders claim this is almost never the case.
The rich history of both edifying and unedifying attempts to fulfill an affirmative-action objective can provide examples to bolster and refute both arguments. There have been programs based strictly on unjustified preference. There have also been cosmetic implementations–cynical ““front office” imagery of a diverse work force being the intent. There are also, on the other side, publicly professed devotees of colorblindness who have used that honorable concept merely to consolidate and defend wha t they profess to regret: workplaces and other institutions in which racial minorities really don’t get a fair shake at all. But practically no one will concede the variegated reality of what is taking place. Rather many will insist that their ideal vers ion of it or nightmare version of it is what’s happening. And as long as this goes on, the quarrel will merely get more heated and less productive.
There was an example of this in the president’s well-covered sound-bite exchange with affirmative-action critic Abigail Thernstrom last week:
MRS. THERNSTROM: Americans believe in affirmative action. They don’t believe in preferences.
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Abigail, do you favor the United States Army abolishing the affirmative-action program that produced Colin Powell? Yes or no. Yes or no.
What was wrong with this exchange was partly the either/or absolutism of it. Do you want unfair preferences? Do you want to pass up the opportunity of having a soldier like Colin Powell at the top? In fact, no one addresses this unavailing exchange more convincingly than Powell himself in his book: ““Equal rights and equal opportunity . . . mean just that. They do not mean preferential treatment. Preferences, no matter how well intended, ultimately breed resentment among the nonpreferred. And pref erential treatment demeans the achievements that minority Americans win by their own efforts. The present debate has . . . a lot to do with definitions. If affirmative action means programs that provide equal opportunity, then I am all for it. If it lead s to preferential treatment or helps those who no longer need help, I am opposed. I benefited from equal opportunity and affirmative action in the Army, but I was not shown preference . . . If a history of discrimination has made it difficult for certain Americans to meet standards, it is only fair to provide temporary means to help them catch up and compete on equal terms. Affirmative action in the best sense promotes equal consideration, not reverse discrimination.”
He’s right on all counts, but how do you write that into law? How do you formulate the regulations so that they will not starkly defy the principle of government’s treating all citizens alike, irrespective of race? There are some good purposes that require discretion, not codification, that will be better served by a slightly fuzzy mandate than one that is carved in stone in formal legalese. This is where I think less candor, or at least less explicitness, not more, is wanted.
I don’t mean the policies should be secretly applied, only that there should be plenty of room for the kinds of voluntary efforts to enlarge their applicant pools, give some assistance (as Powell says) to those who need help to ““catch up and compe te” that so many public and private organizations pursue today. And the more rigid the statutory language commanding these things, the more constitutionally troublesome they become–and the more vulnerable, both to abuse by those who put them into effect , and to defiance and eventually successful court challenge by those who oppose any kind of affirmative action.
What we think of as affirmative action, by the way, began roughly 30 years ago as a demand on previously officially segregated institutions to demonstrate that they were desegregating in good faith. By then Colin Powell was already in the army, w hich, in comparison with other American institutions, was an unusual provider of opportunity to black Americans, the kind of opportunity Powell talks of in his book. Bill Clinton, who understands these things better than that exchange would show, knows t hat affirmative action does not ““produce” anyone. Given at least a fighting chance, people produce themselves. Colin Powell produced Colin Powell. His story–and his views–would be an excellent starting point for a revised national argument.
